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The paper analyses foreign investors' activities in East Germany in the
context of privatization. Based on FDI theories it attempts to explore
their motivations and strategies by investigating their home countries
as well as their target industries. About 5 p.c. of all privatized enter-
prises have been acquired by foreigners. Their share in planned in-
vestment and planned employment results to be markedly larger. For-
eign investors are predominantly originating from those countries
which have longstanding economic relations with West Germany. The
main part of foreign investment goes into manufacturing industries;
into booming as well as into ailing industries. The availability of well-
qualified labour appears to be of major importance for nearly all in-
vestments while contracting favourable terms of sale and taking ad-
vantage of public investment support are especially important for
commitments in ailing industries. Germany's EC-membership gener-
ates further incentives such as to take advantage of the EC regulatory
framework. Using East German production sites as bridgeheads to
serve markets in Central Eastern Europe has been a strong motivation
in the beginning but meanwhile has lost importance. Comparing for-
eign to West German investors, by and large their decisions seem to
be driven by the same determinants.1. Introduction
1
The activities of multinational enterprises, especially their foreign direct investments
(FDI), are considered as factors substantially contributing to economic growth and de-
velopment. In its "World Investment Report 1992" the United Nations Centre on Trans-
national Corporations estimates that on a global scale the flows of capital related to FDI
were about 225 billion US-$ in 1990 and that the stock of FDI reached a magnitude of
1 700 billions US-$ at the end of that year. Besides the high volume of both flows and
stocks, FDI activities are revealing considerable dynamics. From 1986 to 1990 they
grew annually by 25 per cent on average, much faster than world trade did during that
period. Mostly the inflow of FDI contributes to modernize a country's capital stock via
improving enterprises' production technologies and it transfers intangible assets such as
management know-how and corporate identity. The economies of Eastern and Central
Europe, which are in the process of transforming into market-oriented systems are
strongly interested in the transfer of external resources by means of FDI. They expect
foreign investors to bring in both capital and entrepreneurship such as to substantially
contribute to restructure and modernize their economies' productive potential.
By now, Eastern Germany has gathered experience in economic transformation for
about two and a half years - including experiences with the attitudes foreign investors
are revealing towards the chances and risks specific to the scenario of a transforming
economy. It is the subject matter of this paper to take a closer look on foreign investors'
motivations and to explore when and where they assess chances to be greater than risks.
The analysis will focus on foreign investors' participation in privatizing East German
enterprises, a process which mainly is guided by the Treuhand Agency. So far this insti-
tution has been and presently still is the main route of entrance for foreigners willing to
invest in East Germany. Though, as privatization progresses there is a growing number
of cases in which investors undertake initiatives of their own and which are not covered
by data from the Treuhand Agency. 2
An earlier version of this paper was presented at the ACE-Workshop "Entrepreneurial Possibilities
Developing in Central East European Countries and the Enactment of Their Economic Reforms"
held on 10-14 September 1992 in Balatonalmadi. I am grateful for comments and critique I received
from the participants of the workshop as well as from my colleagues Klaus-Dieter Schmidt and
Jiirgen Stehn.
Until August 1992 for example, 33 investors from the US had acquired 48 East German companies
while more than 120 US investors had been said undertaking initiatives on their own, either by es-
tablishing franchise companies, by founding subsidiary companies or by making greenfield invest-
ments.Treuhand data are covering the time period from spring 1991 until autumn 1992 and are
available on a monthly basis. They have to be interpreted very carefully as due to the
relatively short period of time and the relatively small number of cases which are cov-
ered single large investment projects can easily dominate and bias the overall picture.
Besides this, vaguenesses may arise in cases where one investor acquires several com-
panies, in cases where a group of several investors acquires one company and in those
cases where companies are acquired without contracting further investment or employ-
ment commitments. Some of these cases will be dealt with explicitly. Nevertheless, the
data supplied by the Treuhand Agency allow to analyse foreign acquisitions both with
respect to investors' home countries and with respect to their target industries.
With realizing economic unification East Germany has begun to compete for interna-
tionally mobile investment capital. Among others, also East and West Germany have
become important competitors in this respect. Contrasting the flows of FDI into East
Germany - measured by investment commitments - to those into West Germany will
reveal if and how foreigners are differently assessing investment opportunities in these
two different regions. Such differences can be attributed to the transformation specific
scenario in East Germany reflecting the burdens inherited from the socialist period as
well as the chances opening up for the future.
Comparing the inflow of foreign capital into East and West Germany involves meth-
odological problems. Treuhand data on foreign acquisitions cannot easily be compared
to Bundesbank data first, because data from these two sources are based on fundamen-
tally different concepts of "investment" and second because Treuhand data cannot be
properly assigned to time periods. While the Bundesbank reports effective annual flows
of capital, Treuhand data represent accumulated investment commitments, i.e. the sum
of all investment volumes which have been planned and promised when privatization
deals have been negotiated. Parts of these promised investments have already been ef-
fected, other parts will be effected in the future. Some investments may not be effected
at all, while others may even be increased. Furthermore, promised investment volumes
are only one of several elements in the privatization contracts. They are in a trade-off
relationship with employment commitments and sales prices, thus reflecting different
concepts of restructuring. In order to handle these difficulties and to construct a sensible
means of comparison, for West Germany annual flow data from 1987 to 1990 have
been aggregated to a measure which may be called a "consolidated flow indicator".
These data for West Germany shall be contrasted to those for East Germany, namely
the stocks of investment commitments which have been negotiated from May 1991
until October 1992. As rough as this comparison may be, it allows at least to get an idea
of basic structural differences.2. Theoretical Framework
For about more than three decades by now economists have been concerned with the
phenomenon of FDI and have devoted a lot of effort trying to identify its determi-
nants. 3 Foreign direct investment is defined as capital investment across national boun-
daries effected with the intention to control the use of the assets acquired. Mostly, FDI
is undertaken by multinational companies via either acquiring or founding subsidiary
companies abroad. Economic theory has to explain the phenomenon of FDI both with
respect to the volume of flows and stocks and with respect to their country and sectoral
specific pattern. Additionally it has to explain under which conditions FDI as one out of
three available strategies to serve a foreign market appears to be superior to exporting
and licensing. Pursuing these purposes a large number of approaches has been elabo-
rated. The following analysis will be based upon three of them. In order to explain the
volume of FDI, the rate of return hypothesis and the irreversibility approach will be
discussed.^ The country and sector specific patterns of FDI will be explained in the
framework of ownership, location and internalization advantages as it has been set up
by Dunning's eclectic approach to FDI.
a) The Rate of Return Hypothesis and the Irreversibility Approach to Invest-
ment Behaviour
The rate of return hypothesis has been derived from traditional investment theory. It as-
sumes that enterprises are pursuing profit maximization as their primary objective and
that they are doing so by increasing their investment expenditures until expected margi-
nal returns and marginal costs of capital are equalized. Based on this assumption FDI is
explained as a function of international differences in the rates of return on capital in-
vestments. Enterprises are responding to such differences by choosing those countries
for their investments where they expect them to generate the highest returns.
International differences in return on capital are reflecting different marginal produc-
tivities of this factor. The main source for such differences are internationally different
scarcities resulting from different relative capital endowments. Economies in transition,
like the East German one, typically have inherited an outdated capital stock and they
Agarwal (1980), Stehn (1989) and Stehn (1990) are surveying and critically commenting upon both
traditional and more recent approaches to FDI.
As for East Germany cross border capital movements can only be observed since the beginning of
1991, a separate analysis of flows and stocks is not yet meaningful.8
are said to be constrained by scarcity of capital while being relatively richly endowed
with land and/or labour force.
5 Under these circumstances the rate of return hypothesis
would predict strong inflows of capital - either in form of FDI or in form of portfolio
investment - from industrial market economies into the transforming economies of Cen-
tral Eastern Europe and East Germany. So far however strong inflows of capital into
these economies could not be observed. There is capital flowing eastward, but it is do-
ing so quite reluctantly. Therefore, with respect to Eastern Europe the explanatory po-
wer of the rate of return hypothesis appears to be very limited. Its underling assumption
though, namely that enterprises expect their foreign capital investments to be profitable,
is not invalidated by this judgement.
The main reason for which the rate of return hypothesis falls short explaining FDI is
that it does not take account of market imperfections. Would markets be perfect free
trade would be the efficient means to pursue international economic activities. FDI only
occurs in the presence of one or another type of market imperfections. Consequently
FDI theory has to be a theory of imperfect market. Risks have to be considered as a
major source of market imperfections and risk considerations are crucially important for
investors' decisions if, when and where to invest. A fruitful contribution to explain in-
vestors' attitudes towards risk is the irreversibility approach which assumes that
investment expenditures are largely irreversible; that is they are mostly sunk costs
that cannot be recovered and that
enterprises have an option to delay investments; that is they can postpone them
and wait until more information is available. The value of the option to wait is de-
termined by the probability with which future information may contribute to re-
duce risks. Only in cases where investors are striving for pioneer profits and/or
are intending to preempt their competitors, the option to wait is of no value to
them.
6
Transforming economies like the East German one are not only offering transformation
specific investment opportunities but they are also exhibiting a specific level and profile
of risks which considerably differs from the structure of risks in industrialized or in de-
veloping market economies. The main contention of the irreversibility approach is that
in the presence of risks investors are either abstaining from making commitments or
5 Siebert (1990).
6 Pindyck (1991).that they prefer to postpone them as long as they perceive the risk to be too high, if as-
suming that in the course of time it will be reduced. The irreversibility approach con-
tributes to explain the presently rather modest flow of foreign capital into transforming
economies by identifying them as locations with a high risk profile by international in-
vestors' judgement.
b) The Eclectic Approach to Foreign Direct Investment
The eclectic approach to FDI attempts to synthesize and to integrate the large number of
traditional approaches which have been elaborated in the past. It identifies ownership
advantages, locational advantages and internalization advantages as the three major mo-
tivations for FDI. Ownership advantages are to be conceived as temporary firm-specific
competitive advantages a firm has vis-a-vis its foreign competitors. They mainly origi-
nate from intangible assets such as superior knowledge in terms of production tech-
nologies, management know-how or marketing skills as well as brand names or access
to cheap funds. If ownership advantages are large enough to overcompensate for the
additional cost of operating in a foreign market, then firms may feel invited to become
internationally active - either by trade, by licencing or by FDI. They will opt for FDI
only if they can identify locational advantages of the potential host country against their
home country and against other potential host countries.
Locational advantages may originate first from different factor endowments as they are
considered by traditional trade theory which is based on the assumption of perfect mar-
kets and second - in the context of imperfect markets - from
a country's economic system and legal framework which predetermines the degree
of political and economic stability as well as the structure of incentives and con-
straints eocnomic agents are facing,
factors such as the quality of infrastructure or agglomerational advantages which
are important determinants of production costs
factors such as barriers to trade or the availability of marketing and service net-
works which are important determinants of sales perspectives.
Internalization advantages mainly originate from economizing transaction costs, espe-
cially with respect to the cost of internationally transferring and using intangible assets10
such as technological knowledge.^ International licencing is often insufficient such that
the costs of enforcing property rights to intangible goods are prohibitively high. Mostly
this is the case for non-standardized production technologies and for technological
knowledge, management know-how and other skills to which property rights are not
codified but incorporated in an enterprises' employees. Intangible assets to which prop-
erty rights cannot be enforced are public goods. Private costs are diverging from social
costs such that the market mechanism fails to set prices efficiently. This market failure
translates into high transaction cost. Firms which are operating internationally can avoid
to incur them by founding or acquiring subsidiaries abroad such as to use and to transfer
intangible assets on markets which are internal to their organisation. Besides enforcing
and protecting property rights an additional incentive to undertake FDI results from the
fact that intangible assets are often worth more when applied to a larger scale of opera-
tions. Thus, FDI motivated by the possession of intangible assets can be expected to
vary both by enterprise size and by industries depending on their relative intensity of re-
search and development.
The configuration of each ownership, location and internalization advantages as well as
the enterprises' response to them will vary according to firm specific characteristics as
well as to industry and country specific characteristics. For the purpose of this paper it
appears convenient to consider the home country's economy, namely the East German
one, industry by industry. This allows to explore which opportunities each industry may
offer to potential investors and which firm-specific advantages on part of those foreign
investors who actually made their commitments may have promised to be profitably
combined with them. For the time being data on FDI into East Germany do not permit
to carry out a strict empirical test of hypotheses. Nevertheless, the procedure sketched
above allows to draw first conclusions on the ownership, location and internalization
advantages which may be the driving forces behind the presently observed foreign in-
vestment activities (Table 1).
The eclectic approach derives the existence of each kind of advantage as a necessary
condition and the simultaneous existence of advantages of each kind as a sufficient
condition for FDI to be the superior strategy of international economic activity. On this
point though, the eclectic approach has been criticized by Stehn (1989) who argued that
locational advantages of a foreign country are a both necessary and sufficient condition
In the context of FDI theories the concept of intemalization refers to substituting international trade
in intangibles, i.e. trade on markets which are external to the internationally trading enterprise, by
transactions and coordination mechanisms which are internal to the thence multinational enterprise.
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for FDI to occur. This is to say that FDI may be undertaken even without firm specific
advantages on part of the foreign investor if locational advantages in the potential host
country are large enough to (over)compensate for the cost of producing abroad - given
that the internationally producing enterprise possesses firm-specific competitive advan-
tages in its relevant sales markets which may be its home country markets as well as
third countries' markets. Serving third countries' markets, for example markets in Cen-
tral Eastern Europe, especially in the CIS, from production sites acquired or established
in East Germany represents the building of so-called bridgeheads. This may be a rele-
vant motivation for the flow of FDI into East Germany as all investment there - both
foreign and domestic - is subject to large scale public support; a support which is given
on the very purpose to create and to enhance locational advantages such as to attract as
much investment as possible.
Excursus: Internalization as A General Theory of Foreign Direct Investment
The above sketched considerations on internalization advantages have experienced an
interesting enlargement. Rugman (1980) argues that basically all existing theories of
FDI can be considered as subsets of a general theory of internalization. He attempts to
synthesize the traditional approaches to FDI by identifying the recognition of imperfec-
tions in goods and/or factor markets as their common denominator. Such imperfections
prevent free trade to occur and the internalization approach explains the creation of in-
ternal markets by means of FDI as the enterprises' efficient response to them. Those
imperfections can result both from government induced regulations as well as from
market failure and they can lead to both firm specific and country specific advantages.
Prime example for the creation of internal markets as an efficient response to external
markets' failure is foreign direct investment undertaken in order to cope with imperfec-
tions in the international market for knowledge and information. Enterprises which are
founding or acquiring subsidiary companies abroad can overcome these imperfections
by internally using and transferring the knowledge they have produced - incurring the
cost of research and development - on an international scale without disclosing it to
competitors at a zero price. Thus the strategy of FDI appears to be an efficient means to
exploit firm specific advantages created by research and development.
The internalization approach appears to be of special interest for explaining the flow of
FDI into transforming economies as it explicitly points to the importance of market im-
perfections as determinants of FDI. Markets in transforming economies have to be con-
sidered as emerging rather than as existing, well-established institutions. They are not
yet working smoothly but are besetted with imperfections. These imperfections may
invite investors to use them as sources for competitive advantages and future profits.Bibiiofhek
des Instituts fur Weltwirtschaft
13
The major kinds of imperfections one has to think of in the context of privatization in
East German are first, monopolistic industrial structures inherited from the socialist
system and second, a high degree of intervention - both on part of national and on part
of European institutions - into the process of privatization and restructuring.
3. Analyses of Foreign Investors' Activities in Eastern Germany
a) Overview
Foreign investors have had a slow start in Eastern Germany. Although some early start-
ers had already invested 15 Mill. DM at the end of 1990, it was only in the course of
1991 that foreign investors' activities began to develop on a larger scale (Table 2). In
the context of privatization foreigners are acquiring about 5 per cent of East German
enterprises. Their shares in promised investment and employment though are higher,
ranging from 8 per cent to 9 per cent. This mainly reflects that foreigners have been
much less involved in the early stages of privatization, especially in the so-called "small
privatization" where retail stores, restaurants and other small service enterprises have
been sold off. Until the end of November 1992 foreigners acquired 540 East German
enterprises partly or entirely. The promised to invest 17.4 bill. DM and to employ about
120,000 people. When analyzing foreign acquisitions in the context of privatization
from the perspective of FDI the information of only planned investment is not sufficient
to obtain a complete picture of the foreign capital flows related to privatization. Rather,
this information should be complemented by information on the sales prices the foreign
buyers agreed to pay. This information though is not available. But as in the course of
time the overall sales price agreements have been accounting for roughly one fifth of
the overall agreements on planned investment volumes it can be assumed that on the
whole this order of magnitude will also hold with respect to foreign acquisitions.
8
The level of foreign participation which has been reached so far is certainly due to the
active and increasingly intensive acquisition policy the Treuhand Agency has installed.
With only few exceptions, invitations for tenders are announced internationally and in-
ternational investment houses are involved. In the Treuhand's Berlin headquarters two
special departments are in charge of foreign investors' concerns and a net of 11 Treu-
8 Until end of October 1992 the overall proceeds of privatization amounted to 36.2 bill. DM, the total
volume of investment commitments amounted to 157.6 bill. DM.Table 2 - Foreign Investor's Participation in Privatization (April




















































































































(a) Number of sales approved by the Treuhand-Agency's Administrative Board. - (b) Precommitments, i

















8.7 1 013 085
8.4 1 078 295
8.2 1 122 135
8.4 1169 983
8.3 1 220 000
9.0 1 260 000
8.8 1 288 300
8.6 1316 800
9.1 1 331 900
10.5 1 362 700

































































































































































. - (b) Precommitments, not necessarily identical with finally negotiated corn-
Source: Treuhand Agency [b] 1992.16
hand offices has been established in foreign investors' most important home countries.
These organizational devices are complemented by manifold public relation activities.
b) Analyses by Foreign Investors' Home Countries
In the context of privatization the most important source countries of FDI into East
Germany are France, Switzerland and Great Britain (Table 3). 10 French investors have
promised the highest volume of both planned investment and planned employment.
Swiss investors are leading by number of acquisitions and British investors are follow-
ing on place three when all three criteria are considered jointly. These countries, while
leading in terms of promised investments, promised employment or numbers of acqui-
sitions, are at the same time those from which most large single investors - large as
measured by number of companies acquired - are originating (Table 4). Comparing ta-
bles 3 and 4 may give some idea of how strongly single investors can be driving and in-
fluencing the process of privatization.












Number of Investors who












Number of Companies Ac-











Source: Treuhand Agency [b] 1992.
Looking at the relative importance of FDI source countries for East and West Germany
by country groups gives the impression that the source country structure for East Ger-
many is still changing because it is still sensitive to single large privatizations (Table 5).
On the whole, foreigners investing in East Germany are originating from those coun-
9 Austria, Belgium, France, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, Spain
USA.
1
0 This ranking has proved to be quite stable for several months now.17
tries which since long are important economic partners for West Germany. This appears
to be quite plausible as investors from these countries will predominantly be those who
in general are appreciating the German framework of economic and political conditions.
Above this, they have more and better - or at least relatively easier access to - informa-
tion about East Germany than investors from other countries have. Advantages in terms
of easier access to information directly translate into information cost advantages which
then may lead to an earlier starting and a faster running of capital flows from these
countries.




Shares of FDI inflow into
East Germany(b) until







51 42 52 40
11 12 9 25
14 31 26 28
(a) For East Germany only commitments from investors of the ten largest home countries are
included. - (b) Accumulated investment commitments.
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank 1992; Treuhand Agency [b] 1992.
In a growing number of cases, investors who made a first commitment came once again
in order to acquire a further company and to make subsequent commitments. This kind
of fade-in strategy to enter a foreign market results from the investors' attitudes towards
risks as it is explained by the irreversibility approach. Enterprises attempt to avoid sunk
costs as well as to miss the chance of an investment which only temporarily appears too
risky due to lack of information. If additional information becomes available - informa-
tion with as positive sign of course - risk is reduced; lower risk then encourages inves-
tors to make their commitments. And the most reliable information an investor can ever
get is the information he acquires by his own experience. Thus the process of privatiza-
tion via FDI can gain momentum and develop dynamically.
Considerations on risk and information can also contribute to explain why the speed of
privatization with respect to both foreigners - and Germans - has not yet slowed down,
contrary to the expectations and assessments many observers have expressed. The main
difference in selling East German enterprises to foreigners rather than to Germans re-
sults from higher informational requirements in the case of foreign investors and just in
its early stages privatization has been obstructed by lack of information and transpar-
ency. The Treuhand Agency was lacking knowledge of number, nature and location of18
the enterprises scheduled for privatization. Additionally, she had to devote part of her
resources to organize herself and to design the procedures of privatization. Only during
the course of time this initial lack of information and transparency could be cured. The
procedures of privatization became more transparent and wider known, the agency itself
acquired reputation of being a reliable partner in negotiations and, what appears to be at
least equally important, potential investors could observe and gather information about
the fate and performance of enterprises after their privatization had been effected. On
the whole, privatized enterprises are doing quite well, better certainly than those which
have not yet been privatized.
1
1 Furthermore, potential investors meanwhile may have
gathered more and better information on the assets which are still in the Treuhand port-
folio, i.e. scheduled to be privatized as well as information about their competitors' po-
tential entrance in the East German market.
The explanations given above obviously do not hold with respect to Japanese investors.
They so far have been exhibiting an extraordinary reluctance towards activities in East-
ern Germany and, by the way, towards investment into other countries of Central and
Eastern Europe, too. This results from their specific attitudes in choosing FDI host
countries. The choice of host countries for Japanese FDI seems to be much more de-
termined by Japan's home country characteristics, especially national attitudes, as in the
case of other FDI source countries. On principle, Japanese do not go first - neither into
a transforming economy nor into any other. Rather than to strive for pioneer profits in a
new market place, they avoid the unknown environment, giving precedence to others
while themselves opting for and investigating long-term business opportunities. Japa-
nese investors are apparently assessing risks and obstacles higher than other investors
do. This highly risk-averse behaviour can be considered as an illustrative example of
the contentions made by the irreversibility approach to FDI. 12 Besides high risk aver-
sion on part of potential Japanese investors, business climate in both Japan and Europe
is cooling down. This discourages Japanese investment anyhow and it lowers the rela-
tive attractiveness of Europe, including East and West Germany, as host countries for
FDI. In contrast, the dynamic markets of South-East Asia, just on Japan's doorstep are
1
1 Schmidt (1992).
1^ For a closer investigation into Japanese investors' attitudes towards East Germany see Brander et.al.
(1992). In principle, Japanese enterprises appear to be strongly interested in becoming active in
Eastern Germany. But for the time being, they prefer first, to establish representative offices rather
than fully-fledged subsidiaries, second, to engage in service and distribution rather than in produc-
tion and third, to serve the East German market from West German and other European production
sites rather than to set up new plants in East Germany.19
offering very appealing investment opportunities. The countries of this region have be-
come important competitors to European places in attracting foreign capital.
c) Analyses by Foreign Investors' Target Industries
Flows ofFDI into Eastern and Western Germany
Despite all shortcomings of the data base a comparison of FDI inflows between East
and West Germany by target industries reveals significant and clear cut differences
(Table 6). These differences may be ascribed to different host country characteristics as
foreigners are perceiving them for the two economically different regions of Ger-
many, l^ On the whole, foreign investors are mostly investing into manufacturing in-
dustries when acquiring an East German Treuhand enterprise while preferring service
industries when "going West". This may largely be ascribed to the sectoral structure the
Eastern economy inherited from socialist planning, a structure which has been charac-
terized by a strong dominance of the industrial sector, reflecting that the development
of industry has been fostered at the expense of trade and services. The Treuhand Agen-
cy's portfolio and the agenda of privatization are predetermined by these inherited struc-
tures. Most investors, especially those from abroad, are entering the East German econ-
omy via the route of privatization they are bound to choose their ventures among what
is at sale on part of the privatization agency. Foreigners are active in booming industries
such as quarrying, construction and food processing as well as in ailing industries such
as chemicals, steel and machinery. Furthermore, they are active in industries such as
agriculture and food processing which do not appear to be important target industries
for FDI into West Germany. In general, the factors determining foreign investors' pre-
ferred target industries, as they will be explained below, can be assumed not to be ex-
All investment flows into East Germany are subject to general investment support which consists of
grants, premiums and special depreciation allowances. These various kinds of support can be accu-
mulated and in single cases they may even mount up to 50 per cent of the total investment volume.
As these investment supports are regional specific but indifferent with respect to both investors'
home countries and individual industries, they can be expected to generally attract the flow of capi-
tal into East Germany while leaving unaffected its industry specific allocation. The structure of in-
vestors' home countries though may be affected due to the high informational requirements which
are concomitant to the huge and partly even confusing body of public support.20
elusive to them but to be of similar relevance for the investments West Germans are
undertaking in East Germany. 14
Table 6 - Foreign Direct Investment in East and West Germany by Industries
Industry
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing




Quarrying, Ceramics and Glass

























































































1992. - (b) 1987-
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank 1992; data provided by the Treuhand Agency 1992.
Agriculture and forestry
In East Germany foreign investments into agriculture and forestry are accounting for
roughly one fifths of the inflow of foreign funds while in West Germany they are neg-
ligible. This can be explained with home and host country specific factors on the one
hand and firm specific factors of the investor on the other hand. Until October 1992
14 A major exception to this similarity concerns the investment strategies of venture capital funds.
While Anglo-Saxon funds are mostly striving to acquire majority shares up to 100 p.c. in order to
actively guide the acquired enterprise's business policy, German funds ("Kapitalbeteiligungsgesell-
schaften") are preferring to acquire only minority shares, leaving the majority to qualified manage-
rial staff.21
thirteen foreign investors have acquired thirteen East German agricultural enterprises
each of them highly specialized on producing grain, seeds, fruit, poultry, cattle, etc.
Eleven out of these thirteen foreign investors originate from EC-member countries.
Joint EC-membership of FDI home and host country thus accounts for the major part of
FDI into agriculture. Certainly it is not only joint membership itself but EC agricultural
policy which induces such investments. Subsidies and guarantees granted in the context
of EC agricultural policies are generating considerable market imperfections, namely
shelter against world market competition, thus opening up promising profit and rent
seeking opportunities. These opportunities are especially appealing as they can be en-
larged by further country and firm specific factors. Foreign investors' possibilities of
expansion and growth at home can be assumed to be quite limited, if not even ex-
hausted. This holds especially for the Netherlands where "agricultural land" as a natural
resource is not only scarce in quantitative terms but also expended by long-term inten-
sive cultivation. In contrast and complementary to land scarcity in investors' home
countries, agricultural areas are available in Eastern Germany. These areas are not only
available but also attractive due to large average size of the individual lots. While in
West Germany smallholding farms are dominating, the East German economy has in-
herited veritable agricultural factories. Their average size is far above Western Euro-
pean averages and allows to realize substantial economies of scale. Advantages of pro-
tection due to EC agricultural policies plus economies of scale due to large size can be
enlarged further when combining them with investor specific advantages: the dowry
Westerners are bringing into these ventures consists, besides financial capital, of high-
grade intangible assets namely advanced know-how both with respect to agricultural
production techniques and with respect to marketing of agricultural products.
Energy and water supply
Foreign investment into the industry of energy and water supply mainly refers to gas
and, on a smaller scale, to water supply. Predominantly, these investments are induced
by both country and industry specific factors. First and as a basic feature, energy and
water supply are important elements of a country's infrastructure and provide interme-
diate inputs for all other parts of the economy. Second, in East Germany this industry
needs comprehensive modernization first with respect to switching towards energies
which are both available at lower costs and causing less environmental pollution and
second with respect to improving energy distribution. As far as gas is concerned, in East
Germany formerly only one quarter of total gas consumption was based on natural gas
while three quarters relied on artificial gas (gasworks gas and coke oven gas) whose
production costs are more than twice as high as those of natural gas. Conversion to22
natural gas is not only a task by itself but it also entails installing new distribution net-
works as the old ones cannot be adapted for the distribution of natural gas. In these
fields foreign investors can fruitfully bring in their know-how of natural gas specific
technologies and distribution. These knowledge-specific advantages can be combined
with firm-specific advantages by those investors who have direct access to natural re-
source endowments as it is the case for investors from Norway, France (access to Alge-
rian gas deposits) and the CIS. Furthermore, foreigners are profitably involved in lo-
cally supplying gas and water.
Manufacturing
So far the bulk of foreign direct investment into Eastern Germany, about roughly 50 per
cent, has gone into manufacturing industries. This share is ten times as high as the re-
spective share of FDI flows into West German manufacturing. Industries of special re-
levance are chemicals, steel, ship building, food and construction. As far as investments
into East German chemicals, steel and ship building are concerned they will for a con-
siderable part be induced by generous public support - in terms of sales price reduction,
release of old debts or in terms of concessions on behalf of environmental damages -
potential investors can expect from the Treuhand Agency and other public bodies. This
support, which can go far beyond general investment support granted uniformly for all
investments into the East German economy, is mainly lent in order to secure employ-
ment in these industries.
Investments in chemicals appear to be mainly driven by investor-specific know-how of
modern production technologies, i.e. intangible assets which investors expect to profit-
ably transfer to and employ in East German production sites. While these firm specific
advantages can quite easily be identified, country specific factors to induce FDI into
chemicals are virtually absent: the East German chemical industry is plagued by an out-
dated capital stock, by heavily contaminated production sites, by large capacity over-
hang and - what makes it a politically sensitive sector - by considerable overmanning.
Lack of country specific advantages has to be compensated by policy created advan-
tages. This may be illustrated by one of the greatest deals in chemical privatization,
namely the sale of the Leuna and Zeitz refineries which crucially hinged upon provid-
ing exclusive access to the Minol motorway gas stations to the investor (Elf Aquitaine,
France, jointly with Thyssen, West Germany). Only giving this as a "golden handshake"
was an incentive strong enough to attain a 4,000 Mill. DM investment commitment for
a new plant in Leuna. Presently, the refinery there is thus far from operating profitably
that it cannot be restructured. Without establishing a new plant it would not be possible
to maintain and secure employment in this region.23
As far as privatization of steel industry is concerned the main driving forces behind
foreign - and West German - investment flows are market distortions. The European
steel industry is plagued by considerable capacity overhang and at the same time ex-
posed to strong world market competition. It belongs - like agriculture, textiles, coal
mining, chemical fibres and automobiles - to the "sensitive sectors" in which public
support is subject to the EC commissions subsidy control. The commissions approval to
public subsidies is made conditional on capacity reduction both in terms of production
capacities and in terms of employment. This strongly influences the process of privati-
zation as the commission determines the parameters "capacity intensity" and "subsidy
volume" on the industry level while the Treuhand Agency has to negotiate them for
each enterprise individually. For potential investors this creates the incentive to realize a
"first-mover-advantage" in the early stage of privatization, trying to negotiate relatively
high subsidies concomitant with only relatively small capacity reductions - at the ex-
pense of those competitors which may come later and then will face strategic barriers to
market entry.^ Reacting to this incentive can be considered as a variant of oligopolistic
reaction which as a firm specific determinant of FDI works jointly with the location
specific advantages represented by public subsidies on part of the national authorities.
Obviously, incentives of this kind have been the driving force behind the first large
deals in the East German steel industry. The sale of the Hennigsdorf and Brandenburg
steel works to the Italian Riva group is the case in mind (Table 7). Foreign investment
into East German shipyards by the Norwegian Kvaerner may be explained by arguing
along similar lines (Table 8). Investor specific know-how and oligopolistic market
structure hold for firm specific advantages while national economic policy towards
shipbuilding creates locational advantages and additionally, the EC commission's ap-
proach to subsidy control creates incentives to oligopolistic reaction.
The constellation of FDI determinants in construction, quarrying and food processing,
however, is quite different. First, in these industries the business climate is presently
much more favourable than in most other industries. Second, these industries are
strongly connected to regional markets and third, parts of these industries are subject to
market regulation by means of quotas. This shall be illustrated for the privatization of
cement and sugar producers. 16 Both of them are characterized by high transportation
costs which makes them dependent on regional markets and both are characterized by




6 Hartel et. al. (1991).24
erected by restrictive environmental conditions which are prohibitive to market entry
via greenfield investments. In the case of sugar barriers to market entry are erected by
production quotas for sugar beets in the context of EC agricultural policy. For produc-
ers facing these barriers an acquisition in East Germany actually represents an almost
unique possibility to "buy" additional quotas and to expand. Obviously though, these
incentives are driving not only foreign investors but are also working strongly on West
German producers. They had quickly designed a syndicate approach to completely take
over the East German producers of cement and sugar. Foreign investors were only able
to get a look into these industries after intervention of the Federal Cartel Office.
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In nearly all industries some FDI projects are motivated by using East German produc-
tion sites as bridgeheads for serving markets in Central and Eastern Europe. Such a
strategy intends to make use of the longstanding trade relations among former CMEA
countries via internalizing the know-how of Eastern markets which is incorporated in
the staff of the acquired East German enterprises. This eastward orientation though in-
creasingly turns out to be a high risk strategy, especially if envisaged sales markets are
in the former Soviet Union. Trade with enterprises in the republics of the former Soviet
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covery. Thus the "bridgehead"-argument loses much of its appeal for the remaining
parts of the privatization process. Rather, Eastern European countries may even become
serious competitors for East Germany in attracting foreign capital. Given that they suc-
ceed to ensure a stable political and legal framework they can compete with the advan-
tage of low cost for qualified labour in the long and medium run. Notwithstanding this
sceptical assessment of the bridgehead-argument, in single cases CMEA-specific know-
how on part of East German enterprises may open up sound medium-term business per-
spectives, as for example in the case of that East German company which exclusively,
i.e. as a monopolist, has been in charge of maintaining East German nuclear power
plants based on Soviet nuclear technologies. The foreign buyer of this enterprise can
reasonably expect that those power plants will be kept in operation for some further
three or four years, a time span during which demand for the services he offers is basi-
cally guaranteed.
Flows of FDI into East German trade and service industries appear to be relatively weak
compared to their relative importance for trade and services in West Germany. For
West Germany the trade sector offers perspectives to foreign investors mainly in whole-
sale trade and in establishing distribution networks for their domestically produced ex-
ports into Germany. This so far seems to be only of minor relevance in East Germany.
With respect to retail trade foreign participation results to be low because the most at-
tractive bits of this industry have been sold off to West German investors in the course
of the small privatization program.
Though differences of FDI flows into services are significant, the comparability be-
tween East and West German service industries is restricted due to various statistical
and empirical problems. First, the category of "services" is a residual which comprises
very heterogeneous subcategories. One of them, namely purchase of real estate, is do-
minating the picture for West Germany while the activities of investment and holding
companies which presumably are highly important are not completely reported by offi-
cial statistics. In East Germany foreign activities in the service sector are focusing on
planning, engineering and consulting services. This holds for firm-specific advantages
in terms of know-how on part of the foreign investor. Furthermore, broker activities re-
lated to real estate seem to offer promising businesses, hinting to country-specific ad-
vantages in terms of availability of immobile factors.
FDI flows into East German industries are exhibiting further peculiar features which
show up when relating planned investment and planned employment by industries
(Table 9). As a first example, investment commitments in services appear to be surpris-
ingly high in relation to employment commitments there. This puzzle resolves when27
knowing that foreign investment into services is dominated by one single large British
investor (Thames Water Pic. London). Totally, he acquired 26 East German enterprises,
23 of which are classified as service enterprises. The activities of nearly all these 23 en-
terprises are related to environmental concerns: water supply including preparation and
cleaning, disposal of sludge and other wastes and both general and industry specific en-
vironmental protection technologies. These activities are by their very nature much
more capital intensive than service activities in general. Transport equipment is another
industry where considerations on capital intensity are pointing to the activities of one
single large investor, namely the acquisition of the two Eisenach car factories by Gen-
eral Motors via its West German subsidiary of Opel. Similarly, the deal of privatizing
Leuna, Zeitz and Minol is strongly pushing the statistics reporting on investment and
employment commitments.
Table 9 - Capital Intensity of FDI Projects in Eastern Germany by Industries
Industry
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing


















































Source: Data provided by the Treuhand Agency 1992; own calculations.
The findings which have been elaborated by analyzing foreign investment activities in a
sectoral break-up may be illustrated and complemented by presenting the results of a
poll which the German Institute of Economic Research (DIW) has realized in summer28
1992 among 4,800 East German manufacturing enterprises.
1^ Consistent with the infor-
mation Treuhand data are conveying, the share of foreign owned enterprises still ap-
pears to be modest, though the extent to which foreign owned enterprises contribute to
employment is significantly higher than their share in numbers (Table 10).






































the poll sample. - (b) Including both privatized and newly established enter-
Source: DIW, IfW (1992).
According to the poll results, the motivations of West German and foreign investors to
make commitments in East Germany appear to be quite similar (Figure 1). The avail-
ability of well-qualified and highly motivated employees results to be the strongest mo-
tivation. As nearly equally important appears to be access to East German regional
markets. The availability of public support has a higher ranking than the - only tempo-
rary - advantage from relatively low labour costs. Three of the enlisted investment mo-
tivations, namely access to East German regional markets, business opportunities in
Eastern Europe and favourable sales conditions seem to be more important for foreign-
ers than they are for West Germans. At least with respect to taking advantage of busi-
ness opportunities in Eastern Europe, i.e. the building of bridgeheads, it may be doubt-
ful, if investments which have been effected for this reason will turn out to be profitable
and it may be equally doubtful if further investments will be driven by this reason. En-
terprises' turnover expectations for 1993 are a first proof of this scepticism (Tables 11
and 12). Foreign owned firms arc expressing even larger pessimism with respect to East
European markets than enterprises in East and West German ownership do. Foreign
owned enterprises are expecting net reduced turnover for 1993 while firms owned by
West Germans still expect a modest and firms owned by East Germans even expect a
1
7 DIW, IfW (1992).29
strong increase. In 1992 foreign owned firms predominantly have been targeting East
German regional markets on which they intended to realize about half their sales this
year and which they expect to grow by about 20 p.c. in 1993. With respect to Western
foreign markets on which in 1992 foreign owned firms expected to realize only 13 p.c.
of their sales they have expressed the most optimistic growth expectations (+41 p.c).
While in 1992 regional markets appeared to be equally important for firms owned by
both foreigners and West Germans, in 1993 these markets seem to become more impor-
tant for foreigners than for West Germans.
Figure 1 - Determinants of West German and Foreign Investments into East German
Manufacturing Enterprises
We! quoBfled lobour force
Highly motivated lobour force
Low labour costs
Investment support
Access to East German regional markets
Business relations to Eastern Europe
Favourable sotes agreements
Favourable purchase of real esiale
Capacity bottlenecks in other production sites
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Source: DIW, IfW 1992.30
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- (b) Including West-Berlin.
Source: Deutsches Institut fiir Wirtschaftsforschung, Berlin; Institut fiir Weltwirtschaft,
Kiel, 1992.
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Source: Deutsches Institut fiir Wirtschaftsforschung, Berlin; Institut fiir Weltwirtschaft,
Kiel, 1992.
4. Conclusions
Privatization in East Germany has cast off the touch of being a closed-shop event. The
degree of foreign participation, though fairly modest in the beginning, has risen consid-
erably. By now foreign investors' shares in the number of acquired enterprises as well
as in the promised volumes of employment and investment seem to have reached a
higher and stable level. Foreign investors have proved to be sensitive both to market
signals and to policy created incentives. Investment opportunities are not yet exhausted
and further large foreign acquisitions, e.g. in microelectronics and in brown coal min-
ing, are forthcoming. Besides and beyond importance measured in merely quantitative
terms the main merit of foreign participation in privatization is to introduce the element
of external competition. Already the mere threat of foreigners entering the East German31
market forces potential domestic investors have to move much more dynamically. The
higher intensity of competition resulting therefrom improves the process of privatiza-
tion with respect to speed as well as with respect to the efficiency properties of its re-
sults.32
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Source: Treuhand Agency [a] 1992.Table A2- Number of Foreign Acquisitions by Investors' Home Countries
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(a) Australia, Brazil, CIS, Greece, Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Japan, Lichtenstein, Malaysia, Norway, (
as contracted from April 1991 - September 1992. - (c)
category of "Others".
































































































Dman, Sinagpore, Spain, Turkey. - (b) Investment commitments
» not entirely consistent withthose provided in table 3. - (e) Included in the
Source: Treuhand Agency [b] 1992; own calculation.
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